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## NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL INTELLIGENCE COMMITTEE WORKING GROUP

Draft Minutes of the Fourteenth Meeting 1430 Hours, 2 July 1975 White House Situation Room

Chairman:

Lt. Gen. Samuel V. Wilson, D/DCI/IC

Members present:

Mr. Charles Flowerree, Department of State (representing Mr. George S. Vest, Director, Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs)

Mr. Robert Ellsworth, Assistant Secretary of Defense (International Security Affairs) Mr. William N. Morell, Special Assistant to the

Secretary of the Treasury for National

Security

RADM Robert P. Hilton, JCS (representing Lt. Gen. John H. Elder, J-5, Plans and Policy)

Mr. Richard Ober, NSC Staff, Director for

International Coordination

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Briefers:	DIA/Directorate IC Staff	for	Collection


Others present:

VADM E. F. Rectanus, with Mr. Ellsworth RADM Donald Harvey, with RADM Hilton Captain Gerald N. Dyer, with RADM Hilton Lt. Colonel William Fielder, with Major Frank Zachar, with

# Agenda Item 1: Approval of Minutes and Organizational Notice

- The revised draft minutes of the 20 May meeting were approved.
- General Wilson announced that effective prior to the next meeting Lt. Gen. Brent Scowcroft would become the new Chairman. General Wilson said he welcomed this as a necessary step in making the Working Group truly the voice of the consumer.

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#### Agenda Item 2: MBFR Briefing

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- gave a presentation on Intelligence Issues in Mutual and Balanced Force Reduction considerations. This briefing was in response to a recommendation by Ambassador Ellsworth, and was given at the TS level mainly in order to cover discussion of specific collection systems. Most of the briefing and attendant discussion was at a lower level of classification.
- 4. Ambassador Ellsworth made several points in reaction to the briefing, e.g.:
  - --Apart from the Soviet and East European authorities who would object to Western observers seeking to verify an MBFR agreement, the West Germans have indicated that they would not welcome Russian observers on their territory for the same purpose.
  - --Given the uncertainties exposed in this briefing, the problem of monitoring the Warsaw Pact forces in the NATO Guidelines Area (NGA) is pressing even in the absence of an MBFR agreement.
- 5. Admiral Rectanus also made a number of observations, and raised the question of whether the Pact could use qualitative improvements in the capabilities of the forces to offset quantitative changes effected under an MBFR agreement. The DIA briefer conceded that this was theoretically possible but stressed that qualitative changes were easier to detect than quantitative changes.

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- 6. Mr. Flowerree addressed various ways of enhancing our MBFR monitoring capabilities. For example, he asked, would it be worth-while to negotiate freedom of air intelligence collection along certain corridors and borders? The DIA briefer agreed that this would be helpful, if it would be successfully negotiated; so would an agreement to allow personal inspection teams to cover the area (say) 5 times a year.
- 7. There were several other comments on the topic. In closing this portion of the meeting, General Wilson underscored the worrisome implications of the DIA estimate that the Pact forces in the NGA could achieve as much as a 20 percent increase in size over a one year period without detection.

## Agenda Item 3: Status Report

- 8. The Chairman reported that the <u>Objectives</u> paper, which consisted of both substantive objectives and milestones in resource management—the latter portion at least partly responsive to Admiral Hilton's concerns—had been approved by USIB and would be submitted to IRAC. Working Group members would have the opportunity to comment again on the paper, but this time their comments should go directly to NSCIC.
- 9. The Chairman reported that the paper on specific statement of uncertainties was being worked on in pieces. One of these, a paper on expressing uncertainties in technical judgments was now being staffed through GMAIC. Ambassador Ellsworth and Mr. Morell both

made clear that such a paper, while useful, would answer only a part of their requirements on this subject.

#### Agenda Item 4: TRs for NSCIC Working Group

- 11. Mr. Morell noted that the assumptions about organization, arrangements, systems, and the like in the draft TRs are now suspect. Whatever is decided through the Rockefeller and Murphy Reports about NSCIC will inevitably "rub" on us. Therefore we are "starting on the wrong end."
- 12. Mr. Ober observed, however, that we can do much of the drafting prior to the next meeting, and save final decisions until then. He wanted to get comments from the members as soon as possible. Ambassador Ellsworth called attention to Mr. Ober's paper on the work program for (sub)committee(s) of the NSCIC Working Group and proposed that the Ober paper be factored in to the revised TRs.

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13. With regard to the membership of the committee, General Wilson expressed the desire that Mr. Ober chair it. Mr. Ober said that he hoped all nominees for the committee would be users of intelligence, rather than producers.

## Agenda Item 5: Intelligence Issues in Warning

14. This item, originally planned as item 5, was discussed immediately after the MBFR briefing, per decision of the Chairman.

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of the IC Staff discussed the distinction that separates warning from estimates or forecasts: warning implies decisions to take actions. That is, the convergence and summation of the indicators lead to an analysis that in turn leads to a decision to take an action. The action generates indicators to an opponent, and an action-reaction cycle takes place. 

provided illustrations of the complexity of this cycle from the Japanese decision process leading to Pearl Harbor and the Middle East War of October 1973. He then briefly reviewed efforts in the Community to use improved communication techniques to converge critical information. Beyond that, he stressed the need for the Community to make warning statements in probabilistic terms, and the importance for the consumer to accept probabilistic warning estimates because they concern the type of decision (from drastic down to none) he is attempting to make.

16. There were several minutes of general discussion on this briefing. The Chairman said he realized that this briefing was "tutorial" in nature. The main point is there is a need to develop a common

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language between producers and consumers and this type of approach is one useful step toward that end. There was general agreement with the Chairman's comments.

#### Next Meeting

17. There was agreement that the new Chairman would schedule the next meeting for August. Ambassador Ellsworth expressed, on behalf of the other members, congratulations to General Wilson for his efforts as Chairman to get things moving.

Executive Secretary
NSCIC Working Group

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